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ABSTRACT Intelligent Transport System (ITS) is generally deployed to improve road safety, comfort,
security, and traffic efficiency. A robust mechanism of authentication and secure communication is required
to protect privacy and conditional resolution of pseudonyms to revoke malicious vehicles. In a typical
ITS framework, a station can be a vehicle, Road Side Unit (RSU), or a server that can participate in
communication. During authentication, the real identity of an Intelligent Transport System-Station (ITS-
S), referred to as a vehiclecˇnˇ should not be revealed in order to preserve its privacy. In this paper, we
propose a Strong Pseudonym based AutenTicAtion (SPATA) framework for preserving the real identity of
vehicles. The distributed architecture of SPATA allows vehicles to generate pseudonyms in a very private
and secure way. In the absence of a distributed architecture, the privacy cannot be preserved by storing
information regarding vehicles in a single location. Therefore, the concept of linkability of certificates
based on single authority is eliminated. This is done by keeping the real identity to pseudonym mappings
distributed. Furthermore, the size of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is kept small, as only the most
recent revoked communication pseudonyms are kept in the CRL. The privacy of the vehicle is preserved
during the revocation and resolution phase through the distributed mechanism. Empirical results show that
SPATA is a lightweight framework with low computational overhead, average latency, overhead ratio, and
stable delivery ratio, in both sparse and dense network scenarios.
INDEX TERMS Intelligent Transport System, Pseudonym, Privacy, Authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTELLIGENT Transport System (ITS) is an emergingarea that embeds intelligence in vehicles making trans-
portation efficient, comfortable, and safe. In the absence of
intelligence, there may be issues of traffic jams, accidents,
and congestion. Incorporating intelligence in transport sys-
tem results in safe and efficient driving. In case of an accident
on the road, broadcasting relevant messages enables Intel-
ligent Transport System-Stations (ITS-Ss e.g. vehicles) to
diverge among lanes. Such information dissemination avoids
congestion and pile up accidents.
ITS communication architecture, as shown in Figure 1
consists of ITS-Ss such as vehicles, Road Side Units (RSUs),
and servers. The vehicles are equipped with On Board Units
(OBUs) that enable them to communicate with other ITS-Ss
(vehicles or RSUs). ITS supports Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication, known
as V2X communication [1], [2]. Particularly, for V2V and
V2I communications, the IEEE 802.11P standard is used.
This standard is also known as Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environment (WAVE)/Dedicated Short Range Communica-
tion (DSRC) [3], [4].
Each ITS-S (vehicle) broadcasts position messages known
as Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) in Europe [5]
or Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) in the United States
[6]. CAMs are broadcasted among vehicles and RSUs, to
achieve road safety and traffic efficiency. The use of CAMs
includes emergency vehicle warnings, traffic turn collision
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FIGURE 1: ITS communication architecture
warnings, slow vehicle indications, lane change messages,
emergency brakes, traffic condition warning messages, on
the road or roadside stationary vehicles (accident or vehicle
problem), road work messages, hazardous locations, wind,
and visibility warnings. ITS applications are mainly divided
into road safety, traffic efficiency, and infotainment applica-
tions [7]. Infotainment or miscellaneous applications include
advertised services such as public transport information,
point of interest advertisements/notifications, parking facil-
ities, media downloading, local electronic commerce, fleet
management, financial services, real time traffic conditions,
and insurance.
One of the building blocks of ITS is Vehicular Ad hoc
Networks (VANETs) [8]. In VANETs, like other wireless net-
works, there exist attacks that jeopardize a vehicle’s privacy.
False information can be used by an attacker to collect users’
private data and their location [9]. To protect legitimate users’
in VANETs from attackers, privacy and security techniques
must be in place.
The IEEE 1609.2 standard addresses security issues in
VANETs [10]. According to this standard, a Certificate Au-
thority (CA) issues digital certificates to each vehicle in ITS.
In case of a malicious behavior, the vehicle’s certificates
may be revoked. In ITS, both location and identity privacy
is needed to avoid unethical usage by malicious ITS-S. The
author [11] demonstrated privacy in degree levels that is dif-
ferent for every application. Applications that use CAMs for
communication need conditional anonymity. In the case of a
malicious activity, the malicious vehicle should be revoked.
Applications that use infotainment services require privacy
from low to high degree. For instance, if an ITS user is getting
public transport information, it requires low privacy.
Vehicles broadcast beacons (also known as safety mes-
sages) periodically, in order to inform other vehicles about its
current speed, direction, and position. Unfortunately, eaves-
droppers may use the status information of the vehicles for
user tracking [12]. To provide secure and private communica-
tion in ITS, the typical security properties must be preserved,
i.e., privacy, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation
[13], [14].
In order to protect the real identity of a vehicle,
pseudonyms are used [13], [15]. Changing user pseudonyms
at regular intervals is important to avoid linkability [16]. The
pseudonym based techniques, discussed in [17], [18] used
cryptography to protect the identity of a user. However, the
techniques produce high computational and communication
costs. Onion routing, multi-hop anonymization techniques
are not feasible solutions for ITS [19], as its computational
and communication overheads are high. The self generation
pseudonyms are not encouraged in ITS due to Sybil attacks
[20].
Schaub et al. [21] proposed that pseudonym resolution
information should be incorporated in the pseudonym cer-
tificate instead of the pseudonym issuing authorities. How-
ever, the pseudonym to real identity mapping should not be
directly incorporated into the pseudonym certificate, because
it can be used to jeopardize the privacy of source vehicles.
Wang et al. [22] proposed that there should be two servers
one for pseudonym and the second for reputation. However,
this work produces a delay in the communication, due to
extra overhead on the reputation server, in order to com-
pute and check the reputation of vehicles each time. The
authors [23] presented the idea of primary and secondary
pseudonyms. The primary pseudonym is provided by the
CA and is a single point of attack. Similarly, the secondary
pseudonyms are generated through RSUs and are used for
V2X communication. However, RSUs are located in an open
infrastructure, and prone to side channel attacks [24].
The malicious vehicle should be banned from the ITS
network by invalidating its certificates [25]. Schaub et al.
[20] discussed that there should be minimum exposure of
information of a vehicle to other ITS-Ss (vehicles or server).
ITS communication [25] should be conditionally anonymous,
in case of malicious activities, the malicious vehicle should
be revoked.
To provide effective anonymity, two or more beacons
related to the same vehicle should not be linked. If unau-
thorized vehicles are not revoked from ITS communication,
then according to [26], syntactic linking and semantic linking
attacks are possible. In a syntactic linking attack, if in a
given time period only one vehicle changes its pseudonym
among more than two vehicles, the attacker can easily link
two pseudonyms. Similarly, in a semantic linking attack,
the adversary can link different pseudonyms from beacons
by predicting the next pseudonym change position of the
vehicle.
Therefore, in order to consider the aforementioned issues
in ITS, there is a need to develop privacy and security
techniques, that not only preserve the real identity during the
communication but also authorize only the legitimate vehi-
cles to participate in communication. In this paper, we pro-
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pose a novel framework for ITS, namely Strong Pseudonym
based AuthenTicAtion (SPATA) in ITS. The contributions of
this paper are as follows:
• A new framework is proposed for pseudonyms genera-
tion based on multiple entities interaction. Thus, prior
to the pseudonym certificate provided by pseudonym
providers, identity to pseudonym and pseudonym to
pseudonym mapping is deployed. To achieve unlinka-
bility the mapping function is distributed and it is not
possible for a single authority to reveal the real identity
of an ITS-S (vehicle).
• A novel protocol is proposed for the revocation of
malicious vehicles. It preserves the real identity of ve-
hicles, which is revealed only to vehicle manufacturing
company and to law enforcement organization, once
the vehicle is found malicious. During the resolution
of pseudonyms to a real identity, control anonymity is
achieved. The proposed framework of SPATA not only
preserve privacy among vehicles but also eliminate the
concept of single authoritative behavior from certificate
authority.
The rest of the paper is organized as: In section II related
work is presented. In section III, the preliminaries of the
proposed SPATA framework are discussed. In section IV,
SPATA revocation process is presented. Section V consists
of performance analysis. In section VI, security analysis is
presented, while section VII presents conclusion and future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to the ad hoc nature of ITS, there is a problem of
end to end connectivity. Therefore, the authentication and
integrity of messages must be verified [27]. Onion based
routing scheme is not encouraged in ITS due to real time con-
straints. In ITS, the privacy protection schemes are mainly
categorized into Group Signature Based (GSB)/Ring Sig-
nature Based (RSB) schemes and Pseudonym Based (PB)
approaches. Table 1 shows their comparative analysis.
TABLE 1: Existing ITS privacy schemes performance
Parameters GSB/ PB
RSB
Scalability Low High
Computational cost Medium High
Privacy Low Medium
Average latency High High
Overhead ratio High High
Delivery ratio Medium Low
In GSB/RSB approaches [28]–[30], vehicles are grouped
and authenticity is achieved through the public key certifi-
cate. In GSB/RSB approaches, the real identity of a vehicle is
hidden from other members of the group through group keys.
In these schemes, an individual key of the group/ring is used
to sign the message for the group. However, these schemes
are not scalable, because group size is limited. The work
proposed in [29] allows RSUs to sign and verify messages.
However, in order to avoid side channel attacks [23], RSU
participation in pseudonym generation is not encouraged.
Zhang et al. [30] proposed an approach where the RSUs can
be used as a group manager for group management. However,
RSUs may be compromised due to its nature of deployment.
Revocable ring signature approach is presented by Liu et
al. [31] for VANETs security. This scheme provides strong
privacy, but it is limited to a particular ring/group and is not
scalable. Xiong et al. [32] proposed that privacy of vehicles
can be secured conditionally using revocable ring signature,
as the CRL needs to be timely distributed among all ITS-
Ss. This methodology leads to an increase in overhead as the
CRL size grows exponentially.
Most pseudonym based approaches use public key cryp-
tography. The private key is used for message signing, while
the corresponding public key is used for signature verifica-
tion. CA provides pseudonyms along with certificates, and
the relationship between the real identity and pseudonym is
known to the CA. In [13], the author proposed a genera-
tion of bulk pseudonyms and its distribution. The source of
message selects any random pseudonym issued by the CA.
The message is then signed with the corresponding private
key. The message destination verifies the pseudonym through
the corresponding public key certificate. Only the CA can
map the actual identity if the malicious behavior is detected.
In this scheme, CA may be a single point of attack having
mapping information of all ITS-Ss (vehicles).
Raya et al. [33] proposed the idea of Tamper Proof Device
(TPD) or Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the vehicle
OBU. Due to the bulk of pseudonym certificates, the stor-
age and communication overhead increases. The CRL size
also grows exponentially to revoke more than a thousand
pseudonyms. Similarly, another issue is that the CA should
know the vehicle coordinates. The CA can send revocation
messages directly to vehicles. In this case, the privacy of
a vehicle is also affected. To reduce the size of CRL, Sun
et al. [34] suggested the idea of hash chains. However,
calculating crypto hashes of CRL may introduce computa-
tional overheads. Calandriello et al. [35] and Rajput et al.
[36] use a hybrid approach of group signature schemes and
pseudonym based schemes. In these approaches, there is an
extra overhead of each time a message is checked whether
it is from a revoked vehicle or not. Moreover, a common
key pair is assigned to each member of the group, which
may be compromised. RSUs take part in the generation of
pseudonyms for communication and is a single point of
attack.
Identity based verification techniques are introduced in
[37], [38] in order to secure vehicular communication. These
schemes use TPD for generation of pseudonym based iden-
tity certificates. These approaches are inefficient when com-
pared with conventional cryptography, and are prone to De-
nial of Service (DoS) attacks. A conditional privacy preserv-
ing protocol is proposed by Lu et al. [39]. This approach
demonstrates the idea of short time pseudonym keys that are
acquired by the vehicle OBU from RSU. However, RSUs are
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located in open infrastructure and can easily be targeted.
The work proposed in [40] suggests anonymous creden-
tials and Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature for bea-
cons authentication. This approach is not efficient due to
computational overhead. The work proposed in [41] sug-
gests that for collision avoidance in V2V and V2I there
must be linkability between real identity and pseudonym.
However, direct linkability between the real identity and
pseudonym can jeopardize the privacy of vehicles. Shaub et
al. [21] presented an approach to enable the vehicles to obtain
anonymous pseudonym certificates through V tokens. Only
Registration Authority (RA) can recover the real identity and
is a single point of attack. The authors [42] proposed the idea
of an intrusion detection system, to prevent ITS from exter-
nal attacks. However, there is a lack of malicious vehicles
revocation and identification, as there exists internal attacks
in ITS. The protocol proposed in [43] is useful for non-safety
applications because it contains the original identities.
Kamat et al. [44] proposed the approach of a Trusted
Authority (TA) that can issue pseudonym certificates to vehi-
cles. TA is the only assigned entity for certificate generation,
CRL generation and is only a single point of attack. CRL is
stored by base stations, located in nonsecure infrastructure
that can be easily compromised. Wang et al. [45] presented
a scheme in which Key Management Center (KMC) is intro-
duced instead of CA. The KMC is responsible for the whole
communication process. There may be colluding attack as
KMC is the single point of attack.
To avoid the problem of long storage requirements, and to
store PKI certificates in the vehicle OBU, a scheme presented
in [46] suggests a certificate-less public key cryptography
(CL-PKC). In the CL-PKC scheme, the key generation center
(KGC) helps in generating the private key. However, the
scheme incurs a high computational cost with low privacy.
As the KGC is the only assigned entity that helps in the
generation of the private key, and is exposed to colluding
attack. Similarly, another certificate less scheme presented in
[47] to reduce the computational cost, but lacks malicious
vehicle revocation. Tso et al. [48] presented a certificate-
less security model with low computational cost in signature
generation. However, the scheme is exposed to active and
passive attacks. In addition, there is no proper mechanism
for revocation of malicious vehicles. Similarly, Horng et
al. [49] presented a good certificate-less approach for V2I
communication. However, the scheme [49] considers only
V2I communication, and lacks support for malicious vehicle
revocation. In addition, RSU can take part in the signature
verification process, and is prone to side channel attacks, due
to its nature of deployment.
In related work, it has been discussed that trust is not
distributed with adequate privacy control. Similarly, there
are issues of scalability, computational cost, latency, storage,
and communication overhead. In the next section of this
paper, we present the SPATA framework, which is a novel
framework for distributed pseudonym generation protocol.
This is coupled with privacy preserving resolution and revo-
cation mechanism. In SPATA, the accountability of malicious
vehicles is also considered, and thus can be revoked with
privacy. Hence, privacy of vehicles is maintained efficiently.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the proposed SPATA framework, infer-
ences, design objectives, security primitives, privacy metrics,
SPATA proposed protocol, and the threat model is presented.
A. SPATA FRAMEWORK
Private communication in ITS requires hiding the real iden-
tity of ITS-Ss (vehicles). In the SPATA framework, it is not
possible for a single entity to reveal the true identity of a
vehicle. At the same time, the malicious vehicles should be
held accountable for their misbehavior. The SPATA frame-
work is based on pseudonym identities, and certificates in a
distributed manner to avoid linkability.
The SPATA framework is composed of:
1) Vehicular Manufacturing Company (VMC): The
VMC assigns an initial pseudonym to the vehicle
through a secure channel. The VMC is introduced in
the proposed framework, to avoid the concept of the
single authoritative role of the CA. In the proposed
framework, the CA has no information regarding the
real identity of the vehicle. In SPATA, the vehicle
interacts with the VMC once or in case of ownership
changes.
2) Certification Authority (CA): The CA provides Long
Term Certificates (LTC) to vehicles, which are success-
fully verified by the VMC. This has to be done through
a secure channel. The lifetime of an LTC is one year,
or it can be set by the CA in the timestamp field. In
a normal situation, the vehicle interacts for the LTC
with the CA once per year, or as set by the CA in the
timestamp field.
3) Long Term Certification Authority (LTCA): The
LTCA provides a Pseudonym Certificate (PC) to the
vehicle after a reliable verification process, through a
secure channel. The lifetime of PC in normal situations
is six months, or as set by the LTCA in the time stamp
field. However, this should be less than the lifetime of
the LTC. The vehicle contacts the LTCA for the PC
every six months, or as specified by the LTCA in the
timestamp field.
4) Pseudonym Provider (PP): The PP or cascaded
PPs provides Short time Communication Pseudonyms
(SPCs) to the vehicle after a reliable verification pro-
cess, by using a trustworthy channel. To acquire SPCs
for communication, the vehicle frequently interacts
with PP.
5) Source Vehicle: The originator of beacon/safety mes-
sage (Vi), signs the beacon with its private key and
transmits it. The sign beacon consists of the corre-
sponding public key and SPC.
6) Receiving Vehicle: The recipient vehicle (Vj) authen-
ticates the beacon, the signature is verified through
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the corresponding public key and the SPC. In case of
a bogus message, the Vi is reported to PP and LEO
for revocation and accountability. If a signature from
a beacon is not verified, the recipient vehicle simply
discards the beacon.
The validity of SPCs does not depend on the type of
vehicle. For all types of vehicles, the validity of SPCs range
from 20 milliseconds to 60 milliseconds. If a vehicle is
found malicious, SPCs cannot be issued and the vehicle can
no longer participate in the communication. Furthermore,
PP revokes all the issued SPCs of that particular vehicle.
Only in the case of a malicious activity, the real identity
can be revealed by the LEO of that particular country. If
ownership of a vehicle changes, all the certificates need
to be revoked. This revocation leads to unavailability of
pseudonyms communication prior and afterwards. The new
owner of the vehicle needs to repeat the steps from VMC to
PP as shown in Figure 3, detailed in Section III-F.
B. INFERENCES
We assume that VMC discloses the real identity of the
vehicle, to the Law Enforcement Organization (LEO) only
on the basis of malicious activities. All the service providing
authorities should have secure and reliable communication.
In case if any PP is compromised, it will be isolated. A
vehicle requests pseudonyms from VMC, CA, LTCA, and PP,
through RSU or directly using 3G/4G/5G communication.
In the proposed framework, RSU acts as a router between
V2X communications. The RSU does not take part in the
generation or verification of long or short time pseudonym
certificates, in order to avoid the side channel attacks.
There will be several PPs to provide unlinkability by the
attacker. As different pseudonyms are provided by different
pseudonym providers. All the parties’ clocks in the SPATA
framework are synchronized to meet the essence of the ITS,
as there are timestamps in the pseudonymous communica-
tion.
C. DESIGN OBJECTIVES
The proposed SPATA framework design objectives are as
following:
• Confidentiality and authentication: All the commu-
nication should be encrypted. Authentication and au-
thorization of a legitimate vehicle will be performed
without revealing its true identity. The source vehicle
and its beacon will be authenticated without revealing
its true identity to the receiving vehicle.
• Integrity of messages: In case of alteration in beacons,
the signature will not be verified. Then, unverified bea-
cons will be rejected and discarded.
• Non-repudiation: Once a message is verified, it con-
firms the claim of source vehicle. A source vehicle then
cannot deny the communication.
• Revocation: Once, a pseudonym or vehicle is revoked,
it should not take part in the ITS network.
• Restrictive obscurity: The proposed framework is
rendering restrictive obscurity. A vehicle that follows
SPATA rules will have its privacy preserved. The true
identity of a vehicle can be revealed, only in case of
malicious behavior.
D. SECURITY PRIMITIVES
SPATA uses a combination of asymmetric and symmet-
ric cryptographic schemes. Symmetric Key Cryptography
(SKC) operations are faster than Asymmetric Key Cryptog-
raphy (AKC) [50]. However, alone SKC does not provide
the feature of non-repudiation. Therefore, we combine both
techniques to enhance security and privacy performance.
For asymmetric cryptography, Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
(RSA) scheme is used. While for the symmetric key system,
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) technique is used. The
vehicle OBU generates a key pair of public and private keys.
The private key is used for signature generation, while the
public key is sent along with the beacon for verification of
the signature at the receiving end. The key pairs are generated
according to the following rules:
• Two random prime numbers are generated that is a and
b, n is computed, where n is the product of a and b.
n = (a)(b) (1)
• Public key (pb) is calculated such that Greatest Com-
mon Divisor (GCD) between pb and totient function
(ϕ(n)) is 1.
GCD(pb, ϕ(n)) = 1 (2)
Where,
ϕ(n) = (a− 1)(b− 1) (3)
• Private key (pr) is calculated such that:
(pb)(pr) ≡ 1mod(ϕ(n)) (4)
Where the property of congruence is satisfied through
the following equation:
((pb)(pr))− 1)modϕ(n) = 0 (5)
Public key is {pb,n} and private key is {pr,n}. For AES
we use 128 bits (16 bytes) data block and 128 bits symmetric
key. When the message is larger than 128 bits, the Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) method is used [51]. Therefore, we
break the message block into smaller blocks of 128 bits. If
a data block size is less than 128 bits, padding is used, so
that the size of the data block becomes 128 bits. A random
number N , that is exclusive OR (XOR) with the first data
block. Similarly, for the next plaintext block, the previous
ciphertext block acts as a random number. The SPATA, CBC
operation is shown in Figure 2. After ITS-S (server/vehicle)
receives the secure message, it will be verified.
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FIGURE 2: SPATA, CBC Operation
E. PRIVACY METRICS
A good security and privacy approach should provide a high
degree of anonymity. In order to assess the privacy level
through pseudonyms, a range of metrics is suggested. We
discuss the following most considered metrics:
• Anonymity Set Size: In ITS, Anonymity Set (AS) is
the set of vehicles that are identical with the target itself
[52]. The AS size is the number of vehicles included in
the anonymity set. The size of AS corresponds with the
protection of privacy achieved, and in this case should
be larger than one. However, this metric expects that all
vehicles are fairly being the target. Therefore, the AS
metric as debated in [53] cannot be used to describe
what and how many vehicles can be targeted by the
adversary. Therefore, entropy is proposed instead of AS
[53].
• Entropy of AS Size: Entropy expresses distrust in a
random variable. The entropy concept comes from in-
formation theory that provides uncertainty of a random
variable. In case of ITS, random variable is the number
of vehicles.
LetN be a random variable with a probability such that:
yj = prob(n = j) (6)
Where j defines a possible number that N can consider
with probability yj > 0. Each j corresponds to the AS
i.e. yj is the probability of the content that is linked
to vehicles. However, using the following expression,
entropy can be calculated [11] as:
H(N) = −
|AS|∑
j=1
yjLog2(yj) (7)
In the above expression yj is the probability of a vehicle,
j being the target. If the probability of the target/attack
vehicle is the same for all vehicles, there is a uniform
distribution of the probabilities on the AS. The maxi-
mum value of entropy is then achieved by the following
expression:
∀j : yj = 1|AS| , Hmax = −
|AS|∑
j=1
yjLog2(yj) = Log2|AS|
(8)
For example, if there are 25 vehicles and we assume that
all vehicles have the same probability to attack, then
yj=1/25 so (yj=0.04) and the entropy is 4.64. A large
value of entropy shows higher AS size, as the number
of vehicles increases the entropy will increase.
• Anonymity Level: It is supposed that if the attacker
has no past information of the vehicles anonymity set.
The attacked information can be measured through the
following difference: (Hmax − H(N)). Where H(N)
is the effective anonymity set size and Hmax is the
maximum entropy. Diaz [11] suggested d as the level of
anonymity which is a normalized quantity in the range
of [0,1] and the anonymity level is then measured by the
following expression:
d = 1− Hmax −H(N)
Hmax
=
H(N)
Hmax
(9)
In the proposed framework of SPATA, we try to maintain a
high degree of anonymity, through a distributed framework.
F. SPATA PROPOSED PROTOCOL
ITS-S (vehicle) is pre-loaded with a secret key issued by the
VMC, further, it requests an LTC from CA. The CA checks
the identity of the vehicle in CRL, if it is not found then
Algorithm 1 is executed. The SPATA framework is shown in
Figure 3, while the notations used in the proposed protocol
are shown in Table 2.
Algorithm 1 SPATA Process
1: V → VMC: KV VMC [IDVMC ‖ N ‖ IDV ]
2: VMC→ V: KV VMC [P1 ‖ IDVMC ‖ IDCA‖N‖KV ]
3: V→ CA: PkCA[P1‖ IDVMC ‖KV ]
4: CA→VMC: PkVMC [P1‖IDVMC‖KV ]
5: VMC → CA: PkCA[ok or decline] if ok then
6: CA→V: KV [Sk1‖P2‖TS1‖LT1‖IDLTCA‖TokenLTCA]
7: CA→LTCA: PkLTCA[P2‖SK1‖TS1‖LT1‖IDLTCA] or
TokenLTCA
8: V→LTCA: Sk1[P2‖IDLTCA‖TokenLTCA] where TokenLTCA:
KLTCA[P2‖IDLTCA‖TS1‖LT1]
9: LTCA→V: Sk1[P3‖Sk2‖LT2‖TS2‖TokenPP ‖IDPP ]
10: LTCA→PP: PkPP [P3‖Sk2‖IDPP ‖TS2‖LT2] / TokenPP
11: V→PP: Sk2[P3‖IDPP ‖TokenPP ] where TokenPP :
KPP [P3‖IDPP ‖TS2‖LT2]
12: PP→V: Sk2[P4‖P5‖P6‖P7‖TS3‖LT3]
The SPATA protocol shows that:
• Step 1: The vehicle requests the VMC for initial
pseudonym using a secure channel.
• Step 2: The VMC issues an initial pseudonym to the
vehicle through a secure channel.
• Step 3: The vehicle requests CA for LTC, using a secure
channel.
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FIGURE 3: SPATA Framework
TABLE 2: Description of notations used in SPATA
Notations Description
V ITS-S (vehicle)
PP Short Time Pseudonym Provider for
vehicular communication
Sk Session key
KV VMC Secret key shared by V and VMC
Vi Source vehicle
Vj Receiving/affected vehicle
SPCs Short Time Pseudonyms
P1 Pseudonym 1
P2 Pseudonym 2
P3 Pseudonym 3
PkLTCA Public key of LTCA
Sk1 Session key for V and LTCA
Sk2 Session key for V and PP
KV Secret session key for CA and V
PkVMC Public Key of VMC
PkCA Public Key of CA
PkPP Public Key of PP
LT Life Time of pseudonym
TS Time Stamp
‖ Concatination
N Nonce a random number
Token Only for the authorized vehicle / server
KLTCA Secret key shared by CA and LTCA
KPP Secret key shared by LTCA and PP
KV i Secret key of Vi
PkV i Public key of Vi
/ or
• Step 4: The CA verifies the vehicle from the VMC,
using a secure channel.
• Step 5: The VMC verifies or declines the vehicle.
• Step 6: The CA issues LTC to the vehicle, after a
successful verification from the VMC. If CA finds a
vehicle that is malicious, it will be reported to LEO for
further accountability.
• Step 7: The CA informs the LTCA about the LTC of the
vehicle through a secure channel.
• Step 8: The vehicle requests LTCA for PC, through a se-
cure channel. The LTCA verifies the vehicle credentials
through matching tokens as forwarded by the CA and
also provided by the vehicle.
• Step 9: The LTCA issues a long term certificate as PC
to the vehicle, through a secure channel.
• Step 10: The LTCA informs PP or cascaded PP about
the PC of the vehicle, through a secure channel.
• Step 11: The vehicle requests PP for SPCs, on the basis
of the PC through a secure channel.
• Step 12: The PP after verification issues SPCs to the ve-
hicle for communication among V2X, through a secure
channel.
The pseudo code of a vehicle registration in the SPATA
framework is shown in Algorithm 2. Once the vehicle obtains
SPCs from PP or cascaded PPs, that vehicle can communi-
cate with other ITS-Ss (vehicles) and RSUs through SPCs as
shown in Figure 4. In case of bogus beacons from the source
vehicle (Vi), Vi can be reported to LEO for revocation. The
vehicle revocation process is presented in the next section of
this paper.
G. THREAT MODEL
Different types of attacks are considered in the threat model.
The insider or internal attacker cannot obtain the real identity
of a vehicle from the CA, LTCA or PP. This is because
the initial pseudonym is provided by VMC through a secure
channel. Similarly, the VMC cannot obtain the real identity
of a vehicle during communication, as CA, LTCA, and PP
provide communication pseudonyms.
The external attacker role is limited in the SPATA frame-
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Algorithm 2 SPATA Vehicle Registration
1: if V requests CA then
2: V is cross checked with VMC
3: V is authorized by VMC
4: end if
5: if V is authenticated then
6: CA issues LTC to V
7: V requests LTCA for PC
8: end if
9: if V is authenticated then
10: LTCA issues PC
11: V requests PP for SPCs
12: end if
13: if V is authenticated then
14: PP issues SPCs for communication
15: end if
FIGURE 4: SPATA, communication scenario
work, as all the communication is pseudonymized and en-
crypted. Similarly, the role of passive and active attackers are
limited in the SPATA framework, because all communication
is encrypted, and in case of injecting bogus beacons or
alteration in the beacons, the signature cannot be verified.
Theorem: The SPATA framework is semantically secured
against passive and active attacks. Proof: Let an attacker
get a secure message during the communication between a
vehicle and a server. The attacker has to try 2n (where n is
the key size). As the key size in the proposed framework
of SPATA is 128 bits, so the attacker needs to try 2128
(3.4×1038) keys to find the actual key. In the worst case
scenario, if an attacker has a very powerful computer, which
can calculate 106 decryptions per microsecond, the total time
needed is 5.4×1018 years that is impractical for an attacker
in ITS.
Without the key, it is impossible for an attacker to know the
communication. Besides, the key, the nonce N is also used
in the SPATA framework that further enhances the security
of messages. Therefore, an attacker has to know both the key
and the nonce that is impossible in the proposed framework
of SPATA, due to the strong SKC, AKC techniques, and the
distributed mechanism.
Similarly, if an attacker gets a secure message and tries
to alter the beacon contents or insert a bogus beacon, the
signature cannot be verified, and unverified messages are
simply discarded. To launch an active attack, the attacker
needs to generate the key pairs in a real time. However, with-
out prior knowledge of a and b as discussed in Section III-D,
it is impossible to generate the key pairs, which eliminates
the concept of active attacks. The proposed framework of
SPATA uses strong security and privacy measures between
the vehicles and service providers, and this provides a high
degree of anonymity.
To evaluate the proposed theorem, we use entropy. Entropy
shows the amount of secure information in a message to be
sent across the network and is expressed in terms of a discrete
set of probabilities pi, such that:
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi)log2 p(xi) (10)
And:
Hmax = log2|n| (11)
Further to evaluate the probabilities, the Shannon entropy
equation provides a way to estimate the average minimum
number of bits needed to encode a string of symbols, based
on the frequency of the symbols. The average minimum
number of bits per symbol is numBits=[H(X)] where,
H(X) shows the secure information.
A large value of entropy shows that the information being
transmitted is highly secure. Therefore, it is impractical for
an attacker to launch passive or active attacks. In order to
provide a higher degree of security and privacy, information
theory suggests that for the neighboring vehicles, the local
neighborhood probabilities are as follows:
Ω(x, y) = {(x+1, y), (x−1, y), (x, y+1), (x, y−1)} (12)
where, x and y are the coordinates of the communicating
vehicles.
The probabilities related to the total weights of the private
keys of the vehicles are as follows:
Z(x, y) =
∑
(i,j)εΩ(x,y)
H(X)×W ((x, y), (i, j)) (13)
The normal values of the key security at an iteration t + 1
is given by the weighted average of its neighboring normal
values at previous iteration t:
n(t+1)(x, y) =
µ(t+1)(x, y)
|µ(t+1)(x, y)|2 (14)
where,
µ(t+1)(x, y) =
∑
(i,j)εΩ(x,y)
nt(i, j)
W ((x, y), (i, j))
Z(x, y)
(15)
The security primitives used in the proposed framework of
SPATA guarantee a higher degree of anonymity i.e.:
d =
H(X)
Hmax
(16)
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where H(X) is the amount of information being secured
and Hmax is the maximum entropy. Therefore, d shows the
degree of secured information in the communication system.
Hence, honest vehicles can communicate freely with a higher
degree of security and privacy, that guarantee full trust on the
SPATA framework.
IV. REVOCATION IN SPATA
The SPATA revocation and resolution process of a malicious
vehicle is shown in Figure 5. It has the following steps:
• Step 1: The affected vehicle Vj (receiving vehicle of
spurious beacons) informs PP to revoke the SPCs of
the malicious vehicle (Vi). The PP revokes the SPCs
of Vi through broadcasting. Revoked SPCs then cannot
be verified and thus other honest vehicles cannot be
attacked.
• Step 2: The affected vehicle informs LEO for the revo-
cation of the malicious vehicle (Vi) from ITS network
and accountability.
• Step 3: LEO asks CA for revocation of Vi and real
identity mapping.
• Step 4: CA informs PP not to issue more SPCs. The CA
also directs PP or cascaded PP to send the pseudonym
information of Vi to LTCA.
• Step 5: CA revokes LTC. The CA informs LTCA to
revoke the PC of Vi and reports back after PP replies.
• Step 6: PP sends the pseudonym information to LTCA.
• Step 7: LTCA sends the pseudonym information to CA
after revoking the PC of Vi.
• Step 8: CA forwards the pseudonym information of Vi
to LEO.
• Step 9: LEO sends the information to VMC for the real
identity mapping.
In this way, the real identity of Vi can be revealed. The LEO
can take action as per the laws of that particular country. The
protocol steps are subsequently elaborated in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 SPATA Revocation and Resolution
1: Vj → PP: [(beacon message)KV i ‖ PkV i ‖ Pseudonym]
2: Vj → LEO: [(beacon message)KV i ‖ PkV i ‖ Pseudonym]
3: LEO → CA: [(beacon message)KV i ‖ PkV i ‖ Pseudonym]
4: CA→PP: PkPP [(beacon message)KV i ‖ PkV i ‖ Pseudonym]
5: CA→LTCA: PkLTCA[(beacon message)KV i ‖ PkV i ‖ Pseudonym]
6: PP→LTCA: PkLTCA[P3]
7: LTCA→CA: PkCA[P2]
8: CA→LEO: [P1]
9: LEO→VMC: [P1]
The beacons consist of pseudonyms and are stored for a
short period of time. The beacon contents are verified quickly
through the public key and pseudonyms. The beacons are
signed by the private key of the vehicle (Vi). The correspond-
ing public key of Vi is attached with the beacon. In the SPATA
framework, the vehicle cannot deny communication as it is
signed through the vehicle’s private key. The pseudonyms
as provided by PP are attached with beacon messages to
ensure integrity and non-repudiation. The pseudo code of the
SPATA revocation and identity mapping process is shown in
Algorithm 4.
In SPATA, the CRL size does not grow exponentially as
recent communication pseudonyms of the malicious vehicle
are revoked and broadcasted. Thus revoked pseudonyms can-
not be verified.
Algorithm 4 SPATA Revocation and Identity Mapping
1: if Vj reports to LEO then
2: F Vj reports to PP
3: PP revokes the valid SPCs of Vi
4: LEO requests CA for mapping the factual identity of Vi
5: CA revokes LTC and LTCA revokes PC
6: PP sends the available information of Vi to LTCA
7: LTCA sends the available information to CA
8: CA reports back to LEO regarding Vi
9: LEO requests VMC to reveal the original identity of Vi
10: end if
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The SPATA framework has been evaluated using Opportunis-
tic Network Environment (ONE) simulator [54]. The system
used for evaluation of the SPATA framework is a core i7
laptop with 8 GB RAM. The experiments were executed 200
times. The speed of vehicles was kept variable to accurately
evaluate the behavior of SPATA framework. The real map of
Helsinki city was used with random way point model. The
simulation parameters that were used during the experiments
are shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3: Parameter Guidelines for SPATA Modeling
Parameter name Description
Duration 3600 seconds
Interface type Simple broadcast interface
IEEE 802.11P
Transmit speed 10 Mbps
Number of PP 1
Number of vehicles 5 - 100
Slow speed range 10 km/h to 50 km/h
Medium speed range 51 km/h to 80 km/h
High speed range 81 km/h to 120 km/h
Mobility model Map based mobility
Routing protocol Epidemic(EP)
Routing protocol Spary and Wait(SW)
Map of city Helsinki
Transmit range 1000 meters
Area 10 km2
Epidemic (EP) and Spray and Wait (SW) [55] as under-
lying routing protocols have been used in the simulations.
The primary goal of EP and SW routing is to render beacons
with high probability even in the intermittent communication
channel. The EP routing incurs high overhead due to its
flooding nature. In SPATA, the vehicle periodically sends
beacon messages to other vehicles. The SW routing nature
is not an inundation. There is a number associated with the
new beacon showing the limit of admissible copies. The
two routing protocols are considered during simulations to
perfectly analyze the behavior of the SPATA framework. The
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FIGURE 5: SPATA Revocation and Resolution Process of Malicious Vehicle
following network performance parameters are considered
for analyzing the performance of the SPATA framework.
• Average latency = Average (Message delivered
time – Message created time)
• Overhead ratio = (Relayed messages – Delivered
messages) / Delivered messages
• Delivery ratio = Delivered messages / Relayed mes-
sages
A. AVERAGE LATENCY
It is required to show the effect of the SPATA framework
on average latency in sparse and dense scenarios with dif-
ferent speeds. The results obtained during the simulations
are shown in Figure 6. The results show that there is no
significant difference between SPATA and without SPATA
scenarios. We noticed similar trends in sparse and dense
scenarios with both forms of beacons. The reason for the
increase in the average latency in Figure 6 (a), is due to slow
speed vehicles are moving slowly and become congested.
Therefore, the number of beacons received are more and
more bandwidth is occupied. The average latency is less than
1 milliseconds in both cases of encrypted (with SPATA) and
unencrypted (without SPATA) beacons. The average latency
is 0.9 milliseconds only in that scenario where the number of
vehicles is less (up to 30 vehicles). In summary, deployment
of SPATA in a sparse network leads to an increase in latency
while in the dense network the latency is either stable or
decreasing. Moreover, the extra layer of security and privacy
does not hinder communication.
B. OVERHEAD RATIO
The results shown in Figure 7 depict similar trends in case of
with and without SPATA implementation. The results carried
both encrypted and plain text form of beacons for sparse
and dense network scenarios. We noticed that overhead ra-
tio/communication overhead is high only in those scenar-
ios where vehicles received more beacons. The reason is a
minimum gap among vehicles and sense more collision. The
maximum overhead is less than 2% in all type of scenarios
between with and without SPATA, that is negligible as a
tradeoff with privacy and security.
C. DELIVERY RATIO
The delivery ratio is another parameter to show the suitability
of SPATA. The results retrieved during simulations as shown
in Figure 8 reflects no decrease in the delivery ratio with
the deployment of SPATA. The delivery ratio is increasing
in sparse as well as in dense scenarios. However, in the case
of slow speed vehicles, the delivery ratio is decreasing after
the number of vehicles reach 85. This is because slow speed
vehicles become closer and receive more beacons. More
beacons require more bandwidth and start to drop beacons.
While in Figure 8 (b) and Figure 8 (c) the delivery ratio is
increasing or stable with increasing number of vehicles. The
reason is that distances between vehicles are increasing and
occupy less bandwidth. Thus the cryptographic primitives
used in the SPATA framework do not affect the messages
delivery ratio.
D. COMPUTATIONAL COST ANALYSIS
The computational cost of SPATA has been evaluated as
shown in Table 4. The total time taken in the generation of the
beacon, including signature is 3.70 milliseconds. The beacon
verification time is 0.58 milliseconds. The vehicle can easily
and efficiently generate and verify a large number of beacons
simultaneously. The average values for vehicle LTC and PC
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FIGURE 6: Average latency
registration are 4 milliseconds respectively. While for SPCs
the average time taken is 5 milliseconds. The time required
to generate and verify beacon message is less than 5 millisec-
onds. Therefore, the lightweight implementation framework
of SPATA allows certificate authorities and service providers
to process a large number of requests efficiently.
E. MESSAGE SIZES ANALYSIS
The security primitives used in pseudonym generation and
revocation with their field sizes are listed in Table 5. The
message sizes in the SPATA framework between vehicle and
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FIGURE 7: Overhead ratio
authorities during the registration phase are: In step 1, the
total size of the message is 112 bytes. In step 2, the message
size is 144 bytes. In step 3, the total size of the message is
80 bytes. In step 4, the message size is 80 bytes. In step 5,
the total size of the message is 2 bytes. In step 6, the message
size is 180 bytes. In step 7, the message size is 90 bytes. In
step 8, the message size is 154 bytes. In step 9, the message
size is 180 bytes. In step 10, the total size of the message is
90 bytes. In step 11, the message size is 154 bytes. In step
12, the message size can be up to 74 bytes per second, as
communication pseudonyms are changing frequently.
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FIGURE 8: Delivery ratio
The message sizes in the SPATA framework between ve-
hicle and authorities for revocation and real identity mapping
are: In step 1, the total message size is 100 bytes. In step 2,
the message size is 100 bytes. Step 3, the message size is 100
bytes. In step 4, the message size is 100 bytes. Step 5, the
message size is 100 bytes. Step 6, the total message size is 16
bytes. Step 7, the message size is 16 bytes. Step 8 and step 9
the total message sizes are 16 bytes respectively.
From the results, it can be concluded that there are no
substantial differences in scenarios with SPATA and without
SPATA. This shows the literal setup and ideal point of the
TABLE 4: SPATA computational cost in milliseconds
SPATA Average computa- Standard dev-
tional time (ms) iation (ms)
Message 0.18 0.03
encryption
Signature 3.52 0.13
generation
Message 0.21 0.03
decryption
Signature 0.37 0.13
verification
TABLE 5: Individual Field Size of SPATA
Field name Size in bytes
IDVMC 48
N 16
IDV 48
P1 16
KV 16
Sk1 16
TS1 5
LT1 5
IDLTCA 48
IDPP 48
Beacon message 34
Signature 34
PkV i 16
Pseudonym 16
SPATA performance. In order to further check the adaptabil-
ity of SPATA, we implemented SPATA in sparse and dense
scenarios. We also checked the SPATA framework using
slow, medium, and high speed scenarios. In all scenarios, we
found no significant change with or without SPATA. SPATA
is a lightweight approach and does not require to maintain a
long pool of pseudonymous chatty communication.
F. COMPARISON WITH LITERATURE
In this subsection, a comparison of SPATA with existing
GSB/RSB and PB schemes is presented. In SPATA, there is
no need to maintain a long pool of on-board pseudonyms and
large size of CRL. Once a malicious vehicle is revoked, it
cannot take part in communication. There is no need for large
storage in the OBU of the vehicle.
There are multiple authorities and even CA, LTCA, and
PP have no information about the real identity of the vehicle.
In SPATA, if any of the CA, LTCA or PP servers are com-
promised, the real identity of the vehicle cannot be revealed
due to distributed mapping. A comparison of SPATA with
existing schemes is presented in Table 6 and 7, respectively.
The computational and communication overheads of SPATA
are negligible, making it scalable. On the basis of results, it
can be concluded that the SPATA framework is an efficient,
distributed, secure, and robust framework.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section analyzes security and privacy services in the
SPATA framework. Further, various threat scenarios are dis-
cussed.
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TABLE 6: SPATA Comparison with Existing ITS Privacy
Schemes
Parameters GSB/ PB SPATA
RSB
Scalability Low High High
Computational cost Medium High Low
Privacy Low Medium High
Average latency High High Low
Overhead ratio High High Low
Delivery ratio Medium Low High
A. SECURITY AND PRIVACY SERVICES
The proposed SPATA framework is trustworthy and
lightweight with conditional anonymity. There is no single
authority that can reveal the real identity of the vehicle. The
SPATA framework offers the following security and privacy
services:
1) Confidentiality: Vehicle acquires its pseudonyms in a
secure manner. Thus only the service providers have
access to the respective mapping data but not full
mapping. Here, a combination of symmetric and asym-
metric encryption is used for robustness and security.
2) Anonymity: Vehicle uses restrictive obscurity through
pseudonymized identity for communication, after reg-
istration with VMC. This pseudonymized identity pro-
vides anonymous communication among ITS-Ss (ve-
hicles) and service providers. The real identity of the
vehicle is preserved in a controlled way.
3) Integrity: The communication is controlled and moni-
tored by trusted authorities that are VMC, CA, LTCA,
and PP. In case of any alteration in beacons, the signa-
ture can not be verified.
4) Authentication: Vehicle achieves anonymous authen-
tication by verifying the beacons without revealing
source vehicle real identity.
5) Non-repudiation: The communication consists of
messages along with signature and pseudonyms. If a
vehicle is found malicious, the vehicle cannot deny the
communication. As the beacons consist of pseudonyms
provided by the authorities.
B. THREAT SCENARIOS
In order to achieve maximum conditional anonymity and
privacy, the following different types of threat scenarios are
considered in the SPATA framework.
1) All the communication between vehicles and the au-
thorities are encrypted. Therefore, it is impossible for
an adversary to eavesdrop on the communication.
2) It is impossible for an attacker to get SPCsâA˘Z´ without
PC. Similarly, it is impossible for an adversary, to
obtain the PC without LTC. It is also impractical for an
adversary to obtain the LTC without the authorization
of VMC.
3) If the PP is compromised the attacker cannot obtain
any useful information regarding the real identity of the
vehicle. The PP contains only the PC information that
is pseudonymized and encrypted.
4) If the LTCA is compromised the attacker cannot obtain
any useful information regarding the real identity of the
vehicle. The LTCA contains the LTC information that
is pseudonymized and encrypted.
5) Similarly, the CA database contains encrypted and
pseudonymized information. In case, if the CA
database is compromised, no useful information can be
leaked.
6) Once a vehicle is registered in the SPATA frame-
work, the attacker cannot get any useful information
regarding the real identity of a vehicle, in case if the
VMC database is compromised. The vehicle is using
pseudonymized communication among V2X and all
the information in the VMC is encrypted.
7) In case, if an attacker tries to modify a beacon or inject
bogus beacon. The signature cannot be verified.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Privacy and security are always a deep concern in ITS,
because of its loosely coupled network topology. In the
proposed SPATA framework, the pseudonym generation in-
volves multiple certificate authorities to avoid linkability
between the real identity and pseudonym. In the revocation
phase, privacy of a vehicle is preserved even from the ser-
vice providers and certificate authorities. The results show
a stable decrease in the average latency, overhead ratio, and
increase in the delivery ratio for various scenarios and speeds.
The computational cost of all cryptographic primitives im-
plemented in the SPATA framework are negligible and do
not hinder the communication efficiency. In future, we will
use other security techniques for the implementation of the
SPATA framework. We will try to make SPATA more robust
by further reducing the computational overhead, which en-
able it to work efficiently in more complex scenarios with
large number of vehicles.
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